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Shortly before midnight on Saturday, 25 July 1942, four Japanese 
raiders bombed Townsville. Most people were in bed, but in Flinders 
Street there were still a few chattering groups - those who had earlier 
debouched from the Roxy Theatre and stayed in town for a cup of coffee and 
2 
a toasted sandwich. It was three nights before full moon, the entire 
city was bathed in bright moonlight, and only a few white clouds flecked 
3 
the sky. At one of the armed forces' dances still in progress, someone 
at the door shouted 'Air Raid, the sirens are going', whereupon lights 
were extinguished and people exited from the hall, some to drive away 
4 
unconcernedly in their cars, others to seek the safety of slit trenches. 
In Flinders Street, police and air-raid wardens directed pedestrians with 
quiet efficiency and within ten minutes the main street was deserted. 
From trenches and concrete "pill-box" shelters, Townsvilleans strained to 
hear the drone of approaching planes w^ich seemed a long time coming. It 
wasn't until twenty minutes after the initial wailing of the sirens that 
searchlights finally picked up the planes through the "thin, feathery 
I. 6 layer of scudding cloud . Inexplicably, the planes circled the town for 
more than half an hour, leisurely inspecting their targets, before making 
their bombing runs. Then there was "a swish, a swoosh, and a krunk krunk 
krunk; it was one shattering blast and the ground shook momentarily.... 
1. Commonwealth Archives Office (Brisbane), BP/361, Item 5-2 (GHQ 
Communiques), 26/7/1942 [CAO, BP/361, 5-2]. 
2. CAO, BP 257/1, Box 2 (Australian Broadcasting Commission, Queensland: 
Transcripts of Talks, Speeches, Broadcasts, etc., 1938-59) [BP 257/1, 
Box 2], 27/7/1942, p. 1. 
3. Commonwealth Records Series (Canberra), CRS A816, Item 49/301/217 
(R.W. Voller to A.W. Welch, 28/7/1942: Report on Air Raid at Townsville) 
[CRS A816, 49/301/217]. 
4. BP 257/1, Box 2, op.cit., p. 1. 
5. Loc. cit. 




The sound of the planes gradually died away and it was all over." 
Thus the residents of "Australia's only area with city status to 
g 
be bombed by the Japs" experienced their first taste of front-line 
9 
warfare. Two more raids followed within a week. No damage was done 
and no-one was hurt, but admittedly it was the ineptness of the Japanese 
bombardiers rather than the efficiency of Townsville*s defence which was 
the main reason for the citizens' lucky escape. A month before the 
raids the General Officer Commanding (North Queensland Area), General 
Milford, had bluntly described air-raid precautions in the city as 
"frankly unsatisfactory": there were "no adequate lighting restrictions 
and the people are quite uneducated as to the position generally. The 
local press refuses ARP publicity matter for fear of creating a scare.... 
With the lack of organization, over-crowding and great fire risk from 
wooden buildings, a raid would certainly have the most serious conseq-
7. Ibid.. p. 2. See also TDB, 27/7/1942, where, to Sergeant T.C. 
Goode, a member of the Garrison Battalion, it seemed that "there 
were three bombs which dropped", hissing and exploding in "one long 
blast." Cf^ . CRS A816, 49/301/217, op. cit.. where the Camoufleur-
in-Charge, North Queensland Area, reported that the bombs "dropped 
some distance to the east of the wharves and landed in the sea" -
actually, in the tidal flats near the old Power House and the mouth 
of the Ross River. 
8. See L.A. Watson, The Townsville Story, op. cit., p. 28, whose 
account of the first raid tallies with official sources. However, 
the dates given by this writer for the second and third raids are 
inaccurate. Cf^ . also Austin Donnelly, The Port of Townsville: The 
Townsville Harbour Board (Sydney, 1959), esp. Chapter XIX, pp. 144-
149, who reports the dates accurately but not the size of the 
attacking force. There were three raids altogether: the first on 
Saturday night-Sunday morning, 25-26 July, the second at about 
2 a.m. on the morning of Tuesday, 28 July, and the third "just after 
midnight" the following night, i.e., on Wednesday, 29 July (see CAO, 
BP/361, 5-2, op. cit.). The Bulletin was inexact when it described 
the third raid as taking place "late on Tuesday evening" (see TDB, 
27/7/1942; 29/7/1942; 30/7/1942; and cf. NQR. 1/8/1942). 
9. See above fti. 8. The second and third raids were carried out by 
single flying boats (see CAO, BP/361, 5-2, op. cit.). On the 
second occasion bombs were dropped near the Animal Health Station 
at Oonoonba, on the outskirts of the city, "harmlessly" lopping 
some palm trees. On the third occasion, the raider was intercepted 
by allied fighters and jettisoned its bombs in the sea near Cape 
Pallarenda; after being "hit repeatedly" it was "last seen losing 
height and [was] believed to have been destroyed" (CAO, BP/361, 5-2, 
op. cit.). 
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uences for which the Army will not escape a share of responsibility." 
The first raiders, despite their taunting presence over the city 
of at least thirty-five minutes, went completely unchallenged except for 
some sporadic machine-gun fire which, however, was "apparently a mistake." 
The second raid, at least according to the local newspaper, provoked 
"heavy opposition from the anti-aircraft defences", "skilful searchlight 
spotting" and "accurate fire" which must have caused the occupants of 
the "carrier of death and destruction a certain jolt"; but since Townsville's 
anti-aircraft defences as late as May 1942 consisted of no more than one 
12 heavy battery of eight guns, the "jolt" was very likely much less 
serious than journalistic enthusiasm allowed. More realistically, 
Townsville's Camoufleur-in-Charge pondered that at least army and 
13 
civilian defence organisations had had "another excellent practice." 
Only the third raid met with the rather more determined resistance of 
a ntmiber of allied fighters which managed to get airborne before the Jap 
disappeared out to sea, and the pilot of one of the interceptors, a 
Captain John Mainwaring, thought that they might have made a kill "if 
14 
only we had been a bit less excited." At least the dogfight provided 
some spectacular fireworks for the populace, "looking up from their cold 
slit trenches": "the course of the fighters' tracer bullets was plainly 
outlined, and when a hit was seen on the tail of the bomber groups of 
onlookers cheered the fighters. The tail actually caught fire, but for 
some reason it did not spread. The raider appeared to lose height 
temporarily, but then regained it, and the flying boat passed out of 
1.15 the range of the lights. 
One enthralled observer of the "guy fawkes display" was Tom Aikens 
who had been working a train to Townsville w*ien it was flagged down at 
10. CRS A816, 49/301/217 (Report to Secretary, Department of the Army, 
9/6/1942). 
11. CRS A816, 49/301/217 (Report on Air Raid at Townsville), op. cit. 
12. CRS A1608, AJ 27/1/1 (Prime Minister to Premier of Queensland, 
15/5/1942). 
13. CRS A816, 49/301/217 (Report on Air Raid at Townsville), op. cit. 
14. TOB, 30/7/1942. 
15. Loc. cit. 
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Oonoonba. Ordered into a slit trench by a local ARP warden, he objected 
that if he was going to be killed by a Japanese bomb he would go under 
while still "reasonably warm" and stayed where he was on the footplate 
16 
of the engine. His attitude was not atypical of that all over the 
town. There was no panic; there was, on the contrary, an air of "eerie" 
unreality about the whole experience. Some took precautions "because 
you feel a little scared; but you can't do anything, so there is no need 
17 to panic: it's no use." Others remained in high spirits; there were 




stick of bombs was dropped. Everywhere there was calm, patxence and 
cheerfulness. 
Townsville's phlegm under fire was remarkable because the initial 
reaction of her citizens to the outbreak of war had bordered very close 
on panic. Soon after Pearl Harbour, blackout regulations were enforced 
and all radio stations from Townsville north were ordered off the air 
after sunset; finally, after the fall of Lae in March 1942, schools were 
closed down. A hurried exodus to the south began, and by the middle of 
1942 Townsville had lost nearly one-quarter of her population - some 
20 5,000-7,000 souls. "People were scared stiff; you couldn't book a 
plane flight - not that there were many planes flying - you couldn't 
even make a trxmk-line telephone call without first getting the permission 
of the military authorities. People just flocked away; they couldn't get 
on trains out of Townsville quick enough. They leased their homes for 
long periods - if they could find anyone to walk in and take a lease - or 
they just walked out and left their homes empty. Some simply gave their 
.,21 homes away. 
Mass flight from North Queensland was unquestionably encouraged 
by official unwillingness (or unpreparedness) to prevent it - indeed. 
16. See Aikens Mem. (3), p. 117. 
17. CAO, BP 257/1, Box 2, op. cit. 
18. CRS A816, 49/301/217 (Report on Air Raid at Townsville), op. cit. 
19. Loc. cit. 
20. See CRS A816, 37/301/199 (Report on Civilian Morale in Queensland) 
[Report on Civilian Morale], unpaginated. 
21. Aikens Mem. (3), p. 106. 
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by the apparent readiness of Government to condone it. In February 1942, 
for example, local police and ARP wardens, acting under instructions 
from the State Police Coimnissloner, carried out a house to house door-
knock in North Queensland towns to estimate the number of women and 
children who might have to be evacuated. Householders were told that 
they were at liberty then to evacuate their families to any part of 
Queensland, but that later on, if conditions deteriorated, they might 
be ordered to specific evacuation centres without themselves being 
permitted to exercise any option. When North Queenslanders were con-
fronted on their very doorsteps with such evidence of official concern -
indeed, of overt preparations to evacuate the North - it was scarcely 
22 
surprising that dejection and consternation should have spread. Not 
that North Queenslanders were alone in reacting thus to the threat of 
invasion. On 2 January 1942 the Minister for Home Security (Mr. H.P, 
Lazzarini) had contrasted the behaviour of Singapore under siege with 
that of the much less accessible if not wholly untouchable Sydney: 
"Singapore remained calm, there was no sign of panic and every man and 
woman was ready to fight; while in Sydney everybody worried, hundreds 
were going away to the mountains and country evacuation areas. Are 
the people of Australia more interested in taking cover than in getting 
23 
on with the job of winning the war?" 
Australian leaders may have deplored the mass eagerness to decamp, 
but in fact at the root of incipient panic was the absence of leadership. 
Where the national government did not actually appear, as in North 
Queensland, to be actively preparing for evacuation, it gave the impression 
of vacillating indecision. Despite innumerable pleas for the explicit 
22. CRS A1608, AD 39/1/3 (Acting Secretary, Department of Home Security 
to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department). The Secretary of the 
Ayr (North Queensland) Chamber of Commerce had sent a telegram to 
the Department of Home Security asking for an official explanation 
of government policy on evacuation. 





definition of government policy on evacuation, the fledging Labor 
Government in Canberra floundered in a sea of uncertainty. On some 
occasions it gave the appearance of moving towards the final enunciation 
25 
of a policy opposed to evacuation, only later to compound public con-
fusion by retreating to its former equivocal position. As late as July 
and August 1942, when so many thousands had already evacuated themselves, 
the government still remained silent. After the third Japanese raid on 
Townsville, the Mayor, J.S. Gill, vainly begged the Prime Minister to 
"utilize" his "influence" to preserve what was left of "normal life" in 
the city by preventing the wholesale evacuation which was "believed" to 
be "imminent." The compulsory evacuation of Townsville would mean 
"the dislocation of all services now rendered by civilians to the whole 
population extending into the Gulf and the Northern Territory which was 
27 dependent on Townsville for its existence." 
The main cause of official irresolution over the question of 
evacuation was that "urgent military need" seemed likely to require the 
sort of mass abandonment of homes that a government of civilians instinct-
ively opposed. Military authorities in Townsville, for instance, wanted 
the evacuation of the city because the influx of soldiers had made the 
city "congested and overpopulated", and civilian life was "interfering 
28 
with the military control." As early as May 1942 the commander of the 
24. See, for example, CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (Premier of Queensland to 
Prime Minister, 22/5/1942): "Shall be glad to have your views...if 
Townsville evacuation effected a general evacuation from the north 
would undoubtedly result." 
25. One indication of a movement within the Curtin Government towards the 
formulation of a policy opposed to evacuation was contained in the 
Prime Minister's reply to a letter from the Deputy Premier of Queensland 
(F.A. Cooper) on 19 June 1942 in vrtiich Cooper drew attention to the 
vast stocks of non-perishable commodities that merchants and retailers 
were removing from "all vulnerable coastal areas" between Cairns and 
Rockhampton. Curtin advised that "no further stocks of supplies should 
be removed from coastal areas" (see CRS A1608, AD 39/1/3 [Deputy 
Premier of Queensland to Prime Minister, 19/6/1942; Prime Minister 
to Deputy Premier of Queensland, 18/7/1942]). 
26. CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (Mayor of Townsville to Prime Minister, 30/7/1942), 
27. Loc. cit. Similar telegrams were sent by the Townsville Chamber of 
Commerce and the North Queensland Employers' Association. 
28. See CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (J. Hackett to A.W. Fadden, 31/7/1942). 
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First Australian Army sought the compulsory evacuation from Townsville 
of "at least another 10,000 people" whom it was proposed to relocate in 
southern Queensland in the homes of people living between Southport and 
29 
Redcliffe. When the Army Minister, Frank Forde, visited Townsville 
early in 1942, he admitted to one local resident that "the prospect of 
an evacuation" arose from the "severe" pressure being exerted on the 
30 
Federal Government by military authorities. To civilians remaining 
in Townsville the threatened expulsion from their homes would be "a grave 
31 blunder, a serious injustice, even a tragedy." That evacuation did not 
in the end come about was not the result of any purposeful intervention 
by Government: the Commander-in-Chief merely decided that "the present 
strategical situation" for the time being did not justify evacuation and 
32 the Federal Government gratefully acquiesced. 
Canberra did not finally formulate its policy on evacuation until 
September 1942 - seven months after its initial consideration at a 
conference of State Premiers on 4 February 1942 - by which time, of 
course, the flood tide of war had receded from Australian shores and 
most evacuees had returned to their homes. V/holesale evacuation was 
belatedly pronounced "not feasible" and "undesirable", both "in the 
interests of the people themselves and in the interests of the fighting 
33 forces." The people could not be guaranteed adequate accommodation 
nor even "life's necessities" unless they remained in their homes; 
evacuation, moreover, could not be countenanced because of "the inter-
ference with the production of war equipment" which it would entail. 
Only the limited evacuation of young children "from areas contiguous 
29. CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (Premier of Queensland to Prime Minister, 
22/5/1942; and see another letter to Secretary, Department of the 
Army, 11/6/1942). 
30. CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (J. Hackett to A.W. Fadden), op. cit. 
31. Loc. cit. 
32. CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (Secretary, Department of the Army to Secretary, 
Prime Minister's Department, 25/5/1942). See also ibid., Prime 
Minister to Premier of Queensland, 25/5/1942; and Army Minister to 
Commander-in-Chief, 27/5/1942. Cf. ibid., Prime Minister to 
Premier of Queensland, 25/7/1942. 




to likely targets for bombing or shelling" might take place, but even 
then "only when the occasion arises"; otherwise, the people had to be 
educated by propaganda to remain in their homes and to establish a force 
canable of checking the possible spread of panic. Australia's successful 
34 
defence "presupposed" that the morale of the people would remaxn firm. 
The spontaneous and voluntary evacuation of North Queensland 
immediately after Pearl Harbour was not the only indication that the 
"morale" of the people had in fact already plunged to a nadir of despon-
dency that boded ill for the successful prosecution of a protracted war. 
There were hysterical outbursts against "aliens" - the settlers of Italian 
descent who formed such a large component of the regional population - who, 
whether "naturalized or unnaturalized", suddenly found themselves sub-
jected to an organized camp)aign of'vilification, denunciation and 
internment. 
The ripples of hatred even reached Canberra where, on 19 June 1942, 
War Cabinet felt constrained to consider the "trouble" that had arisen in 
35 
regard to the employment of Italians on the North Queensland canefields. 
In Tully, north of Townsville, an "Empire Protestant Defence League" had 
been formed by a prominent member of the Protestant Labor Party, Ernest 
Henry Malin, to foment disaffection among employees in the sugar industry 
36 
and specifically to counsel "Britishers" not to work alongside Italians. 
Xenophobia took the form of concerted efforts by unionists to force Italian 
workers out of the sugar industry; Army Headquarters, Northern Command, 
37 
expressed disquiet that "there was trouble in this direction everywhere." 
Fortunately for the Italians, considerations of military security were 
found to clash with the persecution of aliens: such actions "endangered 
rather than assisted" the safety of the Commonwealth because they antagon-
ized people "who would otherwise be at least neutral in their attitude, 
or, by depriving them of their occupations, make them particularly 
34. Loc. cit. 
35. See CRS A2671, 174/1940 (War Cabinet Minute No. 350, 19/6/1942). 
36. See ibid., (Secretary, Department of Defence Co-ordination to 
Secretary, Department of the Army, 25/7/1940). 
37. Loc. cit. 
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38 
susceptible to subversive influences." On military advice. War 
Cabinet therefore decided that preference in employment should be 
granted to all British subjects (who might be either British bom or 
39 
naturalized), though unnaturalized Italians would not be given 
employment to the exclusion of British subjects. Indeed, beyond 
expressing the pious hope "that our people will not deny friendly aliens 
the right of employment and the ordinary privileges of our social life". 
War Cabinet decided that nothing further need be done for the protection 
of friendly aliens. 
On one occasion, Townsville's Deputy Mayor, Tom Aikens, convent 
a public meeting in the Theatre Royal in an attempt to discredit some of 
the "incredible" stories in circulation concerning the "disloyalty" of 
the Italian population. "I had two of Townsville's most prominent 
businessmen come to see me and complain that one fellow was out in Ross 
Creek in a rowing boat sending morse code messages to Japanese submarines 
off the coast. When I said 'Oh, really, has he got dry batteries; he 
must have some power to transmit', they merely stared at me blankly and 
41 
replied 'He must have something: he's out there tapping away,'" By 
the time of the actual air raids on Townsville, vague accusations of 
"disloyalty" had burgeoned into positive allegations of active espionage: 
an official report on the second raid alluded to the prevalence of 
"rumours" that "flares and signal lights" had illiiminated the raider's 
42 
approach. To Aikens, the continuing internment of aliens and of 
naturalized British subjects "with an anti-British history" seemed "the 
43 
most putrid scandal" associated with the war. 
38. Loc. cit, 
39. See ibid., (War Cabinet Minute No. 350, 19/6/1942), 
40. Loc. cit,, (War Cabinet Communique issued in Brisbane on 2 August 
1940). 
41. Aikens Mem. (3), p. 107. 
42. See CRS A816, 49/301/217 (Report on Air Raid at Townsville, op. cit. 
43. See Aikens Mem, (3), p. 123, There is scope for a most interesting 
study of the internment issue in North Queensland. Details of 
individual internments may be found in Department of the Army files 
held in the Commonwealth Archives Office, Brisbane (see CAO, BP/176, 
Series 3, Folio 28/1/42, 29/308/42 [Aliens Control]), 
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Of course. General Milford's gloomy assessment of Townsville's 
defence capability early in June was hardly calculated to dissipate 
the jumpy suspicions and nervous anxiety of her citizens. At the 
beginning of 1942 Colonel Frank North, Aikens' sometime nemesis on the 
City Council, commanded a "Garrison Battalion" consisting of a handful 
of regulars who manned rifle pits around the perimeter of Castle Hill. 
A Volunteer Defence Corps trained with jam tins full of sand and rifles 
made of wood. One story which swept the town faster than a guinea-grass 
fire told of the VDC sentry who timorously challenged a stranger approaching 
one of the defence installations: "Halt," he said, "give the pass word or 
45 
I'll fill you full of bloody white ants." There were indeed scant 
grounds for even sardonic optimism of this kind. When the Acting Secretary 
of the Department of Home Security, A.W, Welch, visited Townsville for 
five days (10-15 June 1942) to check on the accuracy of General Milford*s 
reports, he could only confirm the GOC's worst fears. The twelve elect-
rically operated sirens in the city were "insufficient"; there was no 
street lighting; provisions for fire-fighting were "inadequate"; the 
water supply was "strained"; the mobility of Air Raid Post Wardens was 
"doubtful" because of the shortage of tubes and tyres; the sewerage 
system was "vulnerable"; there was "no satisfactory response" to his 
inquiry "as to who would be responsible in the event of a raid for the 
co-ordination of civil defence services or for any special measures 
required"; there was "no arrangement for the essential services to be 
represented at the Control Room"; the Control Room itself, as set up in 
the Police Station, "did not appear adequate"; no authority in Townsville, 
not even the GOC himself, had the power to require a blackout; the press 
in Townsville was "not very helpful". Only the shelter facilities -
fifteen of the pill-box type in the business part of the town, 147 
four-man slit trenches in the main street, and some 50 twenty-man 
covered trenches in the various parks and along the bus routes -
46 
appeared "reasonably satisfactory." On the occasion of the first 
44. See above p, 
45. Aikens Mem. (3), p. 107. 
46. See CRS A816, 49/301/217 (Acting Secretary, Department of Home 
Security to Secretary, Department of Defence, 27/7/1942). 
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raid, administrative chaos of the kind reported by Welch resulted in 
the harbour installations, undoubtedly the prime target of the Japanese 
attack, appearing to the incoming raiders as a fairyland of lights. 
Apparently some difficulty was experienced in ascertaining the location 
of the switches and determining who was responsible for the switching off 
of the lights. It is understood that finally the lights were either 
47 
smashed or shot off by the American Army," 
Indeed the "calm" pervading Townsville during the raids proved to 
be no more than a shocked lull in a continuing process of deteriorating 
morale which the preceding months had unfolded. In particular, Australian 
and American armed forces began to arrive in the city virtually from the 
moment the civilian exodus began, and, after a brief interlude of comfort 
and reassurance provided by the flexing of military muscle, a whole host 
of new problems created by military preponderance soon made Townsvilleans 
sigh for a return of the old and much less tangible fears of military 
under-presence. The military build-up lifted Townsville's population 
to an eventual peak of about 90,000 by the middle of 1943; soldiers 
48 
outnumbered civilians by almost three to one. 
The demands of the armed services coupled v/ith a dearth of 
civilian manpower brought widespread inconvenience and embarrassment 
49 
through the sudden disappearance of many basic commodities. Such 
shortages, of course, were common to all nations at war and to the whole 
of Australia, but nowhere in Australia was the disparity in numbers 
between soldiers and civilians so great as in Townsville; the 
50 privations of her citizens were consequently more real. Large 
47. CRS A816, 49/301/217 (from the report of a Chief Clerk, Department 
of Home Security to Secretary, Department of Home Security, 13/8/1942). 
This report followed a three-day visit (1-3 August 1942) to Townsville 
by its author in order to observe the effects of the raids, 
48. See CRS A461, L356/5/2 (Secretary, Department of Labour and National 
Service to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 22/6/1944). 
49. See above, Chapter 2. 
50. This was not only in the opinion of Townsvilleans themselves. At a 
public meeting in Townsville in July 1944, one of the Federal 
Government's leading academic advisers. Professor Copeland, "admitted" 
that North Queensland had "suffered more disabilities during the war 
than probably any other part of the Commonwealth" (see CRS A816, 
31/301/311 [Secretary, Townsville Chamber of Commerce to Private 
Secretary to the Prime Minister, 17/7/1944]). 
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numbers of householders were completely deprived of supplies of ice and 
51 
milk - the two "most serious" shortages; tinned and dried fruits, 
biscuits, alcohol, and especially fresh fruit and vegetables were scarce 
and exorbitantly expensive. All fruit and vegetables arriving in Townsville, 
usually from markets a thousand miles away in the south, were distributed 
either through local wholesalers or a military "Committee of Directions". 
The latter body attempted to indent all army requirements but frequently 
requisitioned from town wholesale merchants if military supplies fell 
short. There were no specific quota allocations to civilians nor indeed 
, 52 
any military consideration of the townspeople s specific needs. Fruit 
became even more of a rarity than vegetables because of the individual 
purchases of soldiers in the town, with the result that "the ordinary 
53 householder and his children [were] forced to go without." Profiteering 
was also rife. Early in 1943 watermelons fetched £1 each in Cairns and 
Townsville; tropical pineapples and pawpaws cost more than they did in 
54 
Sydney. Persistent shortages eventually tried the patience of Towns-
villeans who became "fed up" with "the raw deal and shabby treatment ex-
55 
tended to the people of this city." When beer quotas not only failed 
to improve but actually fell after 1 August 1944 (from 81,512 to 76,120 
gallons), the Townsville Trades and Labour Council contemplated, threatened 
and finally held a one day strike to call attention to the "unrest" among 
the people of Townsville. 
51. See Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
52. I b i d . 
53 . I b i d . 
54. I b i d . 
55. See CAO, BP 18/2, CRC 30 (President, Townsville Trades and Labour 
Council to Chairman, Emergency Food Supply Committee, Townsville, 
15/10/1944). This letter was prompted by continuing bread shortages, 
a short beer quota, the lack of ham, bacon, "dainties", lollies and 
chocolates. Earlier and subsequent correspondence referred to 
shortages of "biscuits, condensed milk, full cream milk, tinned 
fruit, pepper, macaroni, wax matches, household utensils, fencing 
wire and netting, starch, clothes pegs and millet brooms", and to 
the "pernicious practice" of "blackmarketing and back door selling 
at exorbitant rates." 
56. Loc. cit. See also TDB, 6/12/1944 ("Townsville's One Day Strike"). 
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No preparations had been made for the accommodation of any con-
siderable number of troops in Townsville and the military simply 
acquired, whether by official impressment or private treaty, large 
numbers of private homes as well as hotels, cinemas, public halls and 
57 "iS 
schools. Early in 1943, 177 private residences had been taken over. 
Hotel accommodation was at a premium; parks and railway waiting rooms 
served as popular if uncomfortable alternatives. Manpower problems 
forced most of the remaining hotels to close their kitchens and dining 
rooms. The guest who had been fortunate enough to find a bed in one 
usually ended up at the tail of a long queue into a city cafe already 
packed with servicemen. Although the Comforts Fund and other canteens 
served men in unifonn with excellent meals at l/6d, many preferred to 
59 
eat at a higher price in a city restaurant. Twelve months later, when 
the military population had passed its peak, the housing situation still 
60 
showed no improvement: 170 dwellings were occupied by the military. 
By then, Townsville's shortage of housing, "serious" even before the 
61 
arrival of the troops, had become "pressing" and "acute." 
The acquisition of premises by private treaty curiously provoked 
just as much citizen ire as peremptory impressment. Perhaps this was 
somet imes warranted, as when one incensed burgher wrote his member of 
Parliament: "I might say that during the past couple of days since the 
raids have been on, approaches are being made to people owning decent 
homes here, that they be leased to American officers with rental no 
57. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
58. Ibid. 
59. There was a similar situation in regard to milk bars where, to some 
observers, the presence of so many soldiers seemed "extraordinary". 
In the canteens a man in uniform could buy a milkshake "containing 
pasteurized milk" for 4d, whereas in cafes the price ranged from 
6d to 2/-. "The most common price appears to be 9d or 1/-, depending 
on the country of origin of the soldier, the temper of the attendant, 
and the supply of milk" (ibid.), 
60. Of these, 42 houses and 8 flats were occupied by Air Force personnel 
(see CRS A461, L356/5/2, op, cit. 
61. Ibid. (Acting Premier of Queensland to Prime Minister, 15/2/1944; 
and Premier of Queensland to Acting Prime Minister, 8/5/1944). See 
also CRS A461, K356/5/2 (Housing, Queensland: Policy). 
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object; and the statement is being made to the owners of these homes that 
it would be wise for them to take advantage of such offers, as plans are in 
hand by the Australian military authorities for the evacuation of Townsville 
and no rental return will be made for them " For the most part, however, 
the opprobrium earned by the armed forces was not only unjustified but 
cynically bestowed: it was a "common habit" of property owners leasing 
premises "to represent to the citizens that they have been forced out of 
business" whereas in fact the army contracts had been voluntarily solicited, 
63 
eagerly entered into and lucratively discharged. For example, the owners 
of Townsville's architectural pride, the quaintly neo-Byzantine Queen's 
Hotel on the Strand, had their cake and ate it too. They agreed of their 
own free will to led the residential portion of the hotel to the U.S. 
forces at a rental of £50 per day, while still retaining the hotel's 
. 64 principal money-spinner, the bar trade. 
The citizens' growing realization that with or without the armed 
forces Townsville was "in a sad way" - the feeling of being caught 
between Scylla and Charybdis - was only strengthened by the strains which 
an exigent military placed on the city's public utilities. Water was the 
main problem: how to educate a huge transient population to the necessity 
of conserving a deficient and rigorously rationed supply? The Townsville 
City Council became so concerned with wastage that it maintained inspection 
patrols on the large military encampments ringing the city such as that at 
en 
Armstrong's Paddock, "The soldiers, not being used to water restrictions, 
would clean their clothes by throwing them down on the floor and turning 
the showers on them; every shower would be turned on, with a heap of dirty 
68 
clothes on the ablutions' floor." Indeed, Townsville's water shortage 
was a problem of such sheer physical magnitude and public emotional 
entanglement that the full story of various City Council's efforts to 
62. CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (J, Jackett to A.W, Fadden), op. cit. 
63. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit, 
64. Ibid. 
65. CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (J, Huckett to A.W. Fadden), op. cit. 
66. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
67. The site of today's James Cook University's Pimlico campus. 
68. Aikens Mem. (3), p, 114, 
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69 
solve it was assuming the dimensions of a spellbinding saga. Nor were 
commercial laundries any salve to the citizens' sartorial seaminess; soon 
after their arrival American troops took over the Townsville Steam Laundry, 
the only enterprise capable of handling large quantities of linen, and 
military priorities placed the civilian last. One hotel proprietor even 
feared that a military threat of refusal to accept his laundry was being 
used as a weapon to make him surrender all his accommodation to the 
70 
forces. But of all the public utilities which failed to function 
satisfactorily, at least from the citizens' point of view, none was more 
annoying or demoralizing than the practical impossibility of communi-
cating or conversing by telephone. It was "no uncommon experience" for a 
telephone caller to wait up to half an hour before raising the exchange; 
one man watched his house burn to the ground while he vainly tried to ring 
71 the fire station from a neighbour's house." 
Unable to obtain many basic commodities; unable to phone his friends 
or even call for assistance in an emergency; unable to contact his relatives 
outside the city because of a military embargo on all civilian long-
72 distance telephone calls; sequestered at night in his blacked-out 
home "whilst wharves and prisoner-of-war camps were brilliantly illumin-
ated"; unable to visit his friends or go to the pictures after dark 
because of the "disorderly elements among the troops" who roamed the 
73 
streets after nightfall "in hundreds"; unable to attend other enter-
74 
tainments because most of the seats were occupied by troops; unable 
69. See below, Chapter 5. 
70. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
71. Ibid. 
72. See CRS A816, 31/301/311 (Military Security, North Queensland). The 
embargo was partially lifted towards the end of 1944 when, under con-
tinuing pressure from civilians in North Queensland, the Australian 
Commander-in-Chief, General Blarney, decided that permission to make 
"urgent private calls and urgent business calls" should be granted 
"more freely." This resulted in "a large number of urgent private 
calls and genuine business calls being permitted from and to the area 
to which the restrictions apply, subject of course to monitoring" 
(see ibid. [Secretary, Department of the Army to Secretary, Depart-
ment of Defence, 26/10/1944]). 




even to forget his misfortunes in the hotel bars which opened for only 
an hour or two before lunch - the Townsvillean could not help but give 
in to a rising sense of isolation, irritation and abandonment. Morale in 
fact plummeted so low that, in January 1943, the national government 
appointed two academic investigators, a physiologist and an anthropologist, 
75 
to examine the causes and cures of civilian disaffection in North Queensland. 
According to their report, it was "by no means certain" how the civilians 
would react to a protracted war effort, so "resentful" were they of their 
treatment. "Should their complaints remain unheard and their legitimate 
grievances unadjusted, they may well prove easy dupes for enemy propaganda. 
A refusal to co-operate with the Services could easily follow, together 
..76 
with opposition to any Government which aimed at continuing the war. 
These were pretty dire apprehensions. 
The pessimism, if not quite yet defeatism, of North Queenslanders, 
was attributable not merely to the material deprivations following in the 
wake of military occupation but also to the proliferation of unfamiliar 
social problems with which they increasingly felt unable to cope -
prostitution, venereal disease, pugnacity and violence among the troops 
themselves, especially arising out of the real and imagined differences 
between Australian and American national traits. Indeed "the most serious 
source of civilian distrust" was brawling between Australian and American 
servicemen, leading to the citizens' taking sides with one side or the 
77 
other, usually their own, or branding all servicemen as barbarians. 
On the Australian side, the diggers' truculence towards Americans 
stemmed mainly from the pampered softness, even mounting to cowardice, 
with GIs supposedly exhibited, or from simple envy of his supposed sexual 
75. See CRS A816, 37/301/199 (A.A. Conlon, Chairman, Prime Minister's 
Committee on National Morale, to Prime Minister, 1/4/1943; and e n d . . 
Report on Civilian Morale in North Queensland, by Professor R.D. 
Wright, Professor of Physiology in the University of Melbourne, and 
Dr. Ian Hogbin, Lecturer in Anthropology in the University of Sydney, 
pp. 15 (typewritten unpaginated) + appendices. The two academics 
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78 prowess, his high pay, free spending and superior military appurtenances. 
On the American side, "peevish GIs tended to magnify the discomforts of 
life in a new land; in their eagerness to spend their folding green, they 
invited the overcharge of waiters, landlords, florists and taxi-drivers, 
79 
who called their profits 'Yankee cream'." Veterans were not nearly so 
conspicuous in street fighting as those who had not yet faced the enemy. 
The men of Australia's Ninth Division, for example, long absent in the 
deserts of North Africa, returned to Australia "breathing fire and brim-
stone", convinced by German propaganda that the Yanks had stolen their 
80 
wives and sweethearts. When they landed in Sydney, American soldiers 
were instructed to keep to their quarters and the windows of the American 
81 
Centre were boarded up; but not a single incident occurred. Similarly, 
78. See D. Wecter, "The Aussie and the Yank", Atlantic Monthly, 177 
(May 1946), pp. 52-56, in N. Harper, Australia and the United States 
(Melbourne, 1971), pp. 154-155, Cf^ . J.H. Moore, The American-
Australian Alliance (Melbourne, 1970), p. 55. See also Report on 
Civilian Morale, op. cit.: "The conduct of soldiers towards girls 
is another source of criticism. Civilians have very definite views 
on the behaviour proper between the sexes, and transgression is 
looked upon with disfavour. The very free association between the 
members of the American forces and so many of our girls gives rise, 
therefore, to adverse comment. The woman is usually absolved, blame 
being attributed to either the subtlety or the crudity of the 
American, depending on the inclination of the observer." See also 
CRS A1608, AS 39/1/3 (J. Hackett to A.W. Fadden), op. cit.: "it is 
comforting to have so many of the U.S.A. forces here, without them 
we would undoubtedly be in a sad way, but their manner of living 
is in very shapr contrast to the conditions under which our own 
military men are existing." 
79. See D. Wecter, "The Aussie and the Yank", op. cit.: "High pay and 
free spending of our men yielded no more than the usual toll of 
inflation in civilian circles, envy in military ones. GIs with a 
grudge against overcharging,..will readily endorse these sentiments 
of an,expeditionary force member long ago: 'They fleece us piteously; 
the price of everything is exorbitant; in all dealings that we have 
with them they treat us more like enemies than friends,' These words 
were written in 1782 by Count Fersen, staff officer to Lafayette, 
after a winter among the Yankees, Curiously enough, the GIs 
reputation in Australia - that of a stalwart and efficient soldier, 
with too much money and a devastating way with the girls, is almost 
exactly that gained in 1915-19 by the Anzacs in England." 
80. D. Wecter, "The Aussie and the Yank", op, cit. 
81. Loc. cit. 
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diggers in transit through Townsville on their way home from New Guinea 
showed little inclination for argument. Whilst there was not much frat-
ernization between Australian and American veterans, each was ready with 
"unsolicited testimonials for the heroism and fighting ability" of the 
82 
other. On the other hand, many ugly encounters undoubtedly took place 
between rear-echelon troops - to Townsvilleans, the holders of the "Flinders 
Street Star" - and it was these who tended to repeat the stories of American 
83 
cowardice with greatest gusto. Not even stifling censorship - occasionally 
of the sort of obscurantist intensity which led to the banning throu^out 
Queensland of all broadcasts of Boccherini's Minuet and Vienne's Tick Took 
Entr'acte - could conceal from civilians the street "disturbances" which 
bore "an inter-allied aspect" and which showed neither side "in a very 
85 
attractive light", but least of all the Australians. 
If seasoned diggers on the whole treated stories of their loved 
ones' infidelity with the aloofness they usually deserved, their civilian 
counterparts were decidedly less inclined to forgive innumerable other 
instances of what seemed to them rampant immorality. In Townsville there 
was a "marked" increase in the incidence of venereal disease; it was also 
well known that the bordellos behind the Causeway Hotel were veritable mints 
for their resourceful entrepreneurs, one girl accumulating £3,800 in her 
86 
savings bank account over a period of twelve months. What the evidence 
of their own eyes did not confirm, some citizens were prone to leave to 
the embellishment of a prurient imagination. The Officers' Club in the 
Seaview Hotel, notwithstanding a two-hour limit on its bar trading hours, 
was commonly believed to be little more than a brothel, the scene of 
82. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
83. Ibid. 
84. See CAO, BP/361, 1-1, 1-lA (State Publicity Censor: Instruction to 
Broadcasting Stations, 13/5/1942). 
85. See ibid. (State Publicity Censor to Chief Publicity Censor, 
Canberra, 31/7/1943). Probably the most infamous of these "inter-
allied disturbances" was the so-called "Battle of Creek Street" 
(November 1942) when Australians and Americans brawled outside the 
American canteen in Creek Street, Brisbane. For details of similar 
if lesser conflicts in Townsville, see Report on Civilian Morale, 
op. cit. 
86. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
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drunken debauches" and "depraved orgies." On one occasion, so a popular 
story went, 43 girls were forcibly removed from officers' beds and left 
87 
to cool off in the city gaol; on another, an entire railway carriage 
filled with pregnant WAAAFs was supposed to have been surreptitiously 
sent south, with the legend 'Return when empty' scored in chalk on the 
. , 88 
side. In fact, the only evidence of bacchanalian revelries at the 
Seaview consisted in the sounds of laughter and singing which emanated 
from the premises each night; and in the six or seven months spanning 
the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 only one WAAAF had become 
89 
pregnant. Tom Aikens, with his unfailing instinct for sensing a mood, 
blowing it up into lifesize proportions, articulating it and thereby 
assisting it to coagulate, swore just as balefully that "soldiers were 
now pushing the girls whom they had impregnated under Army trucks to save 
90 
themselves the expense of an illegal operation." And that was precisely 
the f)oint: the jumpiness of civilians, the exaggerated stories of military 
rambunctiousness and lawlessness, the gnawing fears and sporadic hysterical 
outbursts were symptoms rather than causes of a deep-seated community 
malaise. 
One other particularly unsettling source of civilian uneasiness 
was the presence of large numbers of American negro troops in and around 
Townsville. "Vi/hat clearly impressed many Australians who saw the Negro 
was his magnificent physique...but [they also] saw him handling machinery, 
performing unusual tasks and at times working with or even directing the 
92 
activities of whites." This had the effect of dislodging the citizens' 
stereotype of the black man as a primitive subhuman - irredeemably lazy, 
shiftless, dissolute, devoid of normal human motivations - and indeed 
87 . I b i d . 
8 8 . I b i d . 
89 . I b i d . 
90. Ibid. See also D. Wecter, "The Aussie and the Yank", op. cit. 
91. Cf. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. : "V/e suggest that the 
eagerness with which charges are repeated may be an indication that 
they are more the excuse than the reason for irritation." 
92. See J.H. Moore, "Australians learn to live with big black bucks", 
The Sunday Review (Melbourne), 13 June 1971, pp. 1022-23. 
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the shock to Australians of the arrival of Negroes on their shores was 
plainly schizophrenic. On the one hand, some residents of North Queens-
land were prepared to accept him for what he was, though admittedly with 
condescending surprise: "I like some of the black Americans. The negroes, 
93 
those I have met further inland, seemed real people." On the other 
hand, Australian officialdom agreed "reluctantly to accept negro soldiers, 
and then only on the condition that they would be withdrawn "at the end 
94 
of the Australian emergency," IVhen one Federal Minister heard that 
negro troops were actually being permitted to patronize brothels in 
Brisbane and Townsville, and that the prostitutes were white Australian 
girls, he recoiled in horror at the thought: "This seems to me to be 
something so outrageous to Australian psychology that it is likely to 
become the gravest possible menace to Australia's war effort.... Perhaps 
nothing embittered the German people more and provided such a fertile 
field of exploitation by Hitler in the early days of the rise of National 
Socialism, than the compelling of the German people to provide white German 
95 
woman to satisfy the lust of American Negroes." In deference to such 
sensitivities, the American Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Theatre, 
General MacArthur, advised the Australian Government that he "respected" 
Australia's racial views and would assign Negroes to "bases far from 
urban centres. 
Townsville, of course, was just such a base "far from urban 
centres", and most of the early arrivals of American troops in the city 
were indeed Negroes. By mid-1942 there were 6,394 negro GIs in Australia 
(representing nearly 40% of all U.S. black troops stationed overseas at 
97 
the time ), most of whom finished up in North Queensland where they 
93. Ibid. (quoting Jean Devanny in Bird of Paradise). 
94. Ibid. 
95. CRS A816, 37/301/199 (Minister for Home Security to Prime Minister, 
14/4/1943). 
96. J.H. Moore, "Australians learn to live with big black bucks", op. cit. 
97. Ibid.: "Only in Northwest Africa and the British Isles were they as 
numerous as in the southwest Pacific.... The most important concen-
tration. . .was at Mt. Isa where by mid-1942 some 5,000 U.S. Personnel -
3,500 of them coloured - manned 1,482 vehicles," 
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they laboured for Australians and built airstrips at places like Woodstock 
98 
and Giru, They had to use hand tools, build wheelbarrows out of boxes, 
99 
clear the scrub with machetes and hire equipment from local farmers. 
Although "far from urban centres" in the south, Woodstock and Giru were 
still about thirty miles outside Townsville. Not only the people of 
Sydney and Melbourne but also those of remote Townsville apparently had 
to be protected from nameless subversion, and even 'out of sight out of 
mind' was deemed inadequate insulation: Queensland newspapers were for-
bidden to carry either letterpress or photographs reporting coloured troops, 
and any reference at all to the colour of U.S. soldiers was ordered to be 
struck out. The terms "negro" or "black" or "coloured" were officially 
regarded as being "detrimental". In these circumstances of almost 
Siberian segregation, the wonder is that the first negro regiments found 
102 their reception in Townsville "quite hospitable", though this may have 
been partly due to the efforts of the Townsville City Coundil to accomm-
odate their biological urge by providing land, water and lighting for "a 
rather large bordello" if the American authorities undertook to erect 
103 it. When that particular proposal foundered, some hundreds of Negroes 
from a large holding encampment just outside the suburb of Wulguru demon-
strated their frustration by marching on the city "in a solid phalanx"; 
98. See U.G, Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, 1966). 
99. Ibid., p. 603: The 91st Engineer General Service Regiment, primarily 
a labour battalion, had no surveying equipment. "With only a carpen-
ter's level, the field could not be properly laid out; drainage, 
slopes, grades and alignments could not be accurately plotted. With 
hand tools, the unit began clearing the area for three landing strips. 
Only machetes were available for cutting the high grass covering 
the area. With all men available for hand work, hand tools soon ran 
out, for there were not enough to go around. The unit rented equip-
ment from nearby farmers, including a horse-drawn mowing machine and 
a farm tractor. Using an empty beer case, a section of a 14" log 
(felled by the farm tractor) as a wheel, a driftpin for an axle, and 
slender 6' poles for handles, the 91st devised homemade wheelbarrows. 
These were augmented by beer boxes rigged with wooden runners and 
drawn by two men holding a wooden pole on the end of a wire attached 
to the improvised sled." 
100. See CAO, BP/361, 1-1, 1-lA (State Publicity Censor: Instruction to 
Press on United States Troops, 16/4/1942, 23/4/1942. 
101. Ibid., 23/4/1942. 
102. See U.G. Lee, The Qnployment of Negro Troops, op. cit., p, 600. 
103. See Aikens Mem. (3), p. 120. 
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only the determined intervention by military police who were grimly armed, 
104 
so one rumour went, with machine guns, finally turned them back. The 
morale of the negro troops thereafter went rapidly to pieces. It wasn't 
restored by having to return to work twenty-four hours a day, "without 
making notable progress", in the arid desolation of the countryside south 
and west of Townsville, "For all the work accomplished by the 91st in 
its first four months in Australia, it was stated to the battalion both 
orally and in v/riting that the unit might as well have stayed in the 
1 Ofi U.S. - sentiments which were no doubt echoed by the GIs themselves 
when, in August 1942, as a result on increasing support provided by the 
107 influx of Australian servicemen, the last negro units left Townsville. 
The fact that the morale of Townsville citizens did not completely 
disintegrate under the incubus of military occupation - though it came 
perilously close to doing so - was in large measure due to the resource-
fulness and leadership of their municipal fathers, Far from being 
intimidated by the military or succumbing, as they must surely have been 
tempted, to the sheer mind-boggling enormity of totally unfamiliar 
problems, they took up the challenge in a vigilant and even imaginative 
way. The proving time was in February 1942 when Aikens called a public 
108 
meeting in the Town Hall "to counteract distrust, defeatism and panic." 
After forming a "Help Australia Committee", it was decided to appeal to 
the Council to send the Mayor to Canberra with a public plea for deliver-
109 
ance. At a special meeting of the Council two days later, the Mayor 
saw his "bounden duty" as remaining in Townsville and Aikens was sent 
104. See J.H. Moore, "Australians learn to live with big black bucks", 
op. cit. Cf. also Aikens Mem. (3), p, 120. Later, the American army 
apparently relented and set up several brothels for the exclusive 
use of negro troops, "much to the disgust of many civilians" (see 
Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit.). 
105. U.G. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, op, cit., pp, 602-604, 
106. Ibid.. p. 604. 
107. See K.C. Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War against Japan 
(Washington, 1966), p, 158. 
108. TDB, 23/2/1942, 
109. See TDB, 24/2/1942: "There appeared to be some panic, and silly 
rumours had gained credence. There was also a looseness of thinking 
and looseness of talking...a spirit of defeatism in Townsville," 
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110 instead. This was the time when North Queenslanders were demanding 
the internment of "fascists", when Townsville's Volunteer Defence Corps 
of some 300 unarmed men were practically all that stood between North • 
Queensland shores and a Japanese invasion, when rumours of sabotage 
swept the city, when police awakened people in the late hours of the 
night and the early hours of the morning, "causing the residents to 
believe that they were on the eve of an evacuation," It was cold 
comfort to the citizens of Townsville to learn from Aikens that, although 
the North lay undefended, ministers of the government in Canberra wanted 
them to remain where they were "as had occurred in Russia, because the 
people left behind the enemy lines were the ones wiio were contributing 
112 
most to the Nazi defeat." Perhaps, however, Aikens' mission had not 
been all that futile: at least on 12 March the distribution of rifles 
113 to the VDC commenced. 
As 1942 drew on, troops arrived, and shortages became ever more 
stringent, the North Queenslander became fixed in his conviction that the 
Federal Government was mostly to blame for his depressing plight. He 
argued that civilian interests ought to have been given some measure of 
protection and that, in its failure to provide this, Canberra had been 
114 
guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Again, the Towns-
ville City Council stepped in to fill the void of leadership. On 9 
November 1942 Aikens was elected Chairman of a "Special Committee" set 
115 
up by the Council "to consider matters arising out of the war situation." 
110. TDB, 27/2/1942. See also TCC Mins. [24], p. 1618, 
111. See Aikens' report to Council, given verbatim in TDB, 19/3/1942. 
See also TCC Mins. [24], p. 1619. 
112. TDB. 19/3/1942. 
113. Ibid. 
114. See Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
115. The Committee was originally constituted in May on a motion of Aikens*. 
See TCC Mins. [24], p. 1641: It was successfully moved "that a Special 
Committee consisting of the Deputy Mayor, Alderman Murgatroyd and 
Alderman Paterson to into the matter of the protection of the civilian 
population in Townsville: firstly, the position of the civilians in 
respect of civil defence; secondly, profiteering by the various 
business houses; thirdly, traffic control. At an Ordinary Meeting 
of the Council on 15 October 1942, the Mayor and Alderman Corcoran 
were added to the committee, which would also "deal with all matters 
arising out of the war situation excepting those which are already 
the functions of the present statutory committees" (see ibid.. pp. 
1689, 1690; and see TCC Reports [1942-1943], Vol. 18, unpaginated). 
235 
I.N. MOLES 
Within a month the Special Committee had ordered an investigation into the 
shortage of ice; recommended that the Price Fixing Commissioners fix the 
price of ice and bread; demanded that children receive priority quotas of 
milk; recommended that the Minister for War Organization of Industry 
institute a zoning system in Townsville for the distribution of meat, 
milk, ice and bread; instigated legal action against the "rack" selling 
of essential goods - the refusal to sell a tube, for example, unless the 
customer also purchased a tjrre; ordered an investigation into the shortage 
of wood fuel; called for controls on the sale and distribution of fruit 
and vegetables; recommended the establishment of a Legal Aid Department 
"for the guidance of citizens as to their main rights as tenants under 
116 
the Landlord and Tenants Regulations." l\tost of the recommendations 
were presently endorsed by the Prime Minister's Committee on National 
)t or 
118 
117 Morale; no nly that, they were promptly implemented by the Townsville 
City Council. 
Some might think that it stretches historical analogy too far to 
compare the membership and functions of Townsville's war-time Special 
Committee with those of the Committee of Public Safety during the French 
Revolution, to see the three fiery Jacobins of Townsville - Aikens, 
Murgatroyd and Paterson - as modern counterparts of Robespierre, St. Just 
and Couthon. Yet both committees set out to achieve similar ends: to 
win the war by a determined mobilization of people and resources, and to 
repress civil strife and counter-revolution at home. For there was civil 
recrimination in Townsville. Like Robespierre's Laws of Maximvmi, the 
Special Committee's programme of "municipalizing" essential services and 
utilities provoked the dismay and antagonism of a section bf Townsville's 
citizenry who were utterly opposed on ideological grounds to what they 
saw as the "red anting" of local government. Not all was sweetness, 
harmony and light among Townsville's civilian population, and there 
were times when the Jacobinism of Hermit Park Labour aroused the fierce 
116. TCC Reports (1942-1943), op. cit. 
117. See Appendix II. 
118. See above. Chapter 3. Both the Municipal Ice Works and the Fruit 
and Vegetable Mart were placed under the control of the Special 
Committee at the beginning of 1944 (see TCC Reports [1942-1943], 
op. cit. 
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resentment of the constituency of the Right. The Townsville Chamber of 
Commerce, for example, protested against the "wasteful expenditure" and 
119 
"futility" of the Council's activities. For its part, the Council 
deplored that "a sprinkling of persons with fascist tendencies" should 
120 have monopolized the city's militia, the VDC; it was alleged that 
"every officer of the VDC in Townsville had taken, at one time or another, 
an anti-labour political part" and that promotions in the VDC were causing 
121 
"dissension" because of such "sectional control." This time the 
Returned Soldiers' League showed its disapproval by objecting to City 
Council representation at its farewells to recruits while a Communist, 
122 Paterson remained an alderman. 
Dissension among civilians, however, was as nothing compared with 
the tension between civilians and the military, which made it all the 
more noteworthy when the Special Committee, at Aikens' prodding,success-
fully sponsored formal co-operation between the two. Indeed the only 
occasions on which City Council, State police, Australian and American 
military authorities ever acted in concert were at meetings of a Traffic 
Advisory Committee instigated and chaired by Aikens, In 1942 and 1943 
the streets of Townsville were "busier than the principal thoroughfares 
of Sydney and Melbourne four years ago"; on one afternoon in January 
119. See The Courier-Ma11 (Brisbane), 3/3/1942; also TCC Mins. [24], p. 
1619. On 19 March Alderman Paterson moved in Council "that a letter 
be written to the Townsville Chamber of Commerce, that this Council 
regrets the publication of the Press item in the "Courier-Mail" 
and shall be pleased to know if such wire was sent to the Premier, 
and if so, whether it was approved of by the members of the Chamber, 
or, if it was not sent, the Council would be pleased if your 
Chamber would take steps to publish a denial in the "Courier-Mail" 
(TDB, 19/3/1942). 
120. TDB, 19/3/1942. 
121. Ibid. 
122. See, for example, TDB, 21/11/1941: "The draft which left to rein-
force the AIF abroad on Thursday evening was enthusiastically 
farewelled, although on this occasion the City Council was not 
represented at any of the gatherings.... The President of the 
R,S,S.A.I.L.A. asked the young recruits to have a parting glass 
with the old Diggers.... The troops after partaking of the excellent 
repast which is provided by the good women... there was community 
singing until such time as the troops marched off to the Central 
Station amid the usual enthusiastic scenes." 
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1943, 316 army trucks were counted in Flinders Street within the space 
123 
of fifteen minutes. Military drivers were notorious for their 
"carelessness and utter disregard for the safety of other users of the 
104 
roads", and in one two-month period 57 traffic accidents resulted in 
125 13 fatalities. The Traffic Advisory Committee took the lead of 
recommending amendments to the motor vehicle regulations, which included 
the imposition of a 25 m.p.h. speek limit within the boundaries of 
126 Townsville. According to the Bulletin, the campaign bore good results, 
"despite the disregard of Townsville citizens who rode bikes at night 
without lights, sometimes two or three abreast, and who, in small-town 
fashion, paraded along Townsville's roadways in preference to the foot-
127 
paths, walking in the direction of the traffic instead of against it." 
Thus, the Townsville City Council never once relaxed its efforts on 
128 
behalf of a perplexed and sorely tried citizenry. However, in the 
absence of any sustained interest on the part of the national government 
in dispelling the effects of isolation and occupation, the people's 
spirits faltered and almost failed. At the beginning of 1943, the Prime 
Minister's Committee on National Morale wondered whether Townsvilleans 
still had their hearts in the military conflict. It couldn't find much 
ground for optimism: "contributions have been made to war loans...again, 
although there have been one or two very minor holdups on the waterfront, 
the indefatigable efforts of the railway workers have won the unbounded 
129 
admiration of everyone." On the other hand, civilian vexation was so 
great that the Committee felt unable to guarantee, if the grievances of 
North Queenslanders remained unheard, that they would "still be willing 
to co-operate freely once the Japanese [had] been thrown out of New Guinea 
123. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
124. Ibid. 
125. See TDB. 21/12/1942 (reporting the "fifth fatality for a week"), 
22/12/1942, 7/1/1943, 12/1/1943, 4/3/1943. Cf^ . also Report on 
Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
126. See TCC Mins. [24], p. 1706; TCC Reports (1942-1943), op. cit. 
See also TDB, 22/12/1942, 12/1/1943. Cf. Aikens Mem. (3), pp. 
Ill 112. 
127. See TDB. 7/1/1943, 12/1/1943. 
128. See above. Chapter 3. 
129. Report on Civilian Morale, op. cit. 
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130 
and their safety [was] no longer directly menaced." 
By the end of 1943 there were few encouraging signs that civilian 
demoralization had been stanched; to the contrary, a mass meeting of 
Townsville's citizens on the Strand listened intently to Aikens' bodeful 
recitation of Government neglect which hung over Townsville like the 
sword of Damocles, threatening her citizens with disaster. As late as 
mid-1944. North Queenslanders still nurtured "an abiding sense" that 
southern governments in Brisbane and Canberra were ignorant of their 
131 
"total war-time experiences" and indifferent to them. The chief 
spokesman of that mood was Tom Aikens; and Townsvilleans now elected him 
to the Parliament in Brisbane to evoke it, to shame and bludgeon Govern-
ment with it. 
130. Ibid. 
131. See CRS A816, 31/301/311, op. cit. 
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